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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Plaintiffs Amie Marie Beers-Capitol and Aliya Tate, two 
female former residents at the Youth Development Center 
at New Castle, Pennsylvania (YDC), a detention facility for 
juveniles run by the Pennsylvania Department of Public 
Welfare, appeal from the District Court's grant of summary 
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judgment against them in this 42 U.S.C. S 1983 civil rights 
lawsuit that they brought against various YDC employees 
and supervisors. During their time at YDC, the plaintiffs 
were sexually assaulted by Barry Whetzel, a YDC employee 
who was working as a youth development aide at the time 
he committed the assaults. Whetzel was eventually 
convicted of criminal charges arising out of these incidents. 
Beers-Capitol and Tate then brought a civil rights action 
alleging violations of their Eighth Amendment rights and 
naming as defendants: Whetzel; three of his supervisors, 
Robert Liggett, the Executive Director of YDC, Charles 
Earnhart, a YDC director, and Joseph Flecher, a YDC 
manager; and two of his co-workers, Nora Burley, a YDC 
counselor, and Shirley Robinson, a YDC youth development 
aide. After the District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of all of the other defendants, the plaintif fs won a 
judgment of $200,000 against Whetzel. 
 
An Eighth Amendment claim against a prison official 
must meet two requirements: (1) "the deprivation alleged 
must be, objectively, sufficiently serious;" and (2) the 
"prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of 
mind." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted). In prison 
conditions cases, "that state of mind is one of`deliberate 
indifference' to inmate health or safety." Id. "Deliberate 
indifference" is a subjective standar d under Farmer--the 
prison official-defendant must actually have known or been 
aware of the excessive risk to inmate safety. The parties 
agree that the sexual assaults against Beers-Capitol and 
Tate were sufficiently serious, so the determinative issue in 
this case is whether the defendants' actions and inaction 
rose to the level of deliberate indiffer ence. Depending on the 
roles and responsibilities of the r espective defendants, the 
plaintiffs have set forth two bases for their claims of 
deliberate indifference. With r espect to the defendants who 
are alleged to have had notice that Whetzel was having sex 
with one or more of the female residents at YDC, the 
plaintiffs assert that these defendants took inadequate (or 
no) measures in response to this notice. W ith respect to the 
defendants who are not alleged to have had knowledge of 
the specific risk that Whetzel posed, the plaintif fs claim 
that these defendants either implemented or failed to 
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implement YDC policies that created a situation in which 
an employee like Whetzel would be able to sexually assault 
female residents at YDC without being discover ed for some 
time, and that these defendants were awar e that such 
policies created this risk but ignored it. 
 
We will affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment for defendants Liggett, Earnhart, Flecher, and 
Robinson, because the evidence that the plaintif fs proffer 
against these defendants fails to raise an infer ence that 
these defendants actually knew or were awar e of the 
significant risk of harm to the plaintif fs. However, we will 
reverse the grant of summary judgment for defendant 
Burley, because the plaintiffs have pr esented evidence that 
Burley told one of the plaintiffs that she"kind of knew" that 
Whetzel was "messing" with the female r esidents at YDC. 
This evidence, along with Burley's admission in her 
deposition that she heard numerous rumors that Whetzel 
was having sex with the female residents, is sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Burley was 
aware of the significant risk that Whetzel posed to the 
plaintiffs but did not adequately respond to this risk.1 
 I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
YDC is a Pennsylvania Department of Public W elfare 
institution that houses adjudicated delinquent juvenile 
offenders, both male and female; the female r esidents range 
in age between 13 and 21 years and come from all areas of 
the state. YDC is divided into several "Units," and each of 
these Units is itself divided into several "cottages." Beers- 
Capitol and Tate were housed in Unit 7, which contained 
the female residents. Unit 7 is comprised of three cottages: 
7A, 7B, and 7C. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The defendants also raise a defense of qualified immunity. This issue 
was not reached by the District Court (because it granted summary 
judgment on the merits). With regar d to the defendants for whom we will 
affirm summary judgment, we need not decide the issue of qualified 
immunity. With regard to the defendant for whom we will reverse 
summary judgment, her acts of deliberate indif ference to an excessive 
risk to the plaintiffs foreclose her claim of qualified immunity. See 
infra 
note 15. 
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Defendant Robert Liggett is the Executive Dir ector of 
YDC; as such he has ultimate responsibility for the overall 
operation of YDC. His duties include managing YDC's daily 
operation, supervising and training the staf f, and 
formulating and implementing all operational policies, 
regulations, and practices. Defendant Charles Lee Earnhart 
was the unit director for Units 7 and 8 during the relevant 
time period. Earnhart was responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of Unit 7, including the supervision of the staff 
of the unit, and the review and evaluation of staff reports 
and scheduled work. Liggett directly supervised Earnhart, 
who in turn directly supervised the unit managers, meeting 
with these managers daily. Defendant Joseph Flecher was 
the unit manager for Unit 7 during the relevant time period. 
Unit managers are responsible for developing, coordinating, 
and administering program services for their unit; they also 
directly supervise the cottage supervisors within their unit. 
Cottage supervisors directly supervise counselors, youth 
development aides, and other staff in their cottages (no 
cottage supervisor is a defendant in this case). Defendant 
Nora Burley was a counselor who worked in Unit 7, and 
defendant Shirley Robinson was a youth development aide 
in Unit 7. Counselors provide security in the units and 
monitor resident interactions, and youth development aides 
perform a similar role. Whetzel was also a youth 
development aide in Unit 7. 
 New staff members at YDC receive two weeks of training 
on YDC policies. Because the residents incar cerated at YDC 
often have previously suffered sexual abuse and have 
become sexually active at an early age, this training 
includes instruction on how to identify and appr opriately 
handle cases of sexual victimization and abuse, and how to 
deal with female residents who express sexual interest in 
staff members. The staff are taught that the YDC residents 
are likely to express attraction to them and to approach 
them in a sexual manner, and that any sexual relations 
with residents are unethical and absolutely forbidden. Alice 
Peoples, the Training Manager at YDC, testified that YDC 
employees are taught that children who ar e sexually 
abused often afterwards deny that the abuse occurred. 
Peoples also stated that she informs YDC employees at 
their training that they are legally responsible to report any 
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allegations of abuse, and that failure to r eport such 
allegations could result in them being char ged with abuse 
themselves. 
 
YDC is subject to 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 6311, a 
Pennsylvania state law on child abuse reporting which 
provides that any staff member of a facility like YDC who 
receives an allegation of abuse or otherwise becomes aware 
of such abuse must notify the person in char ge of the 
facility (in this case, Executive Director Liggett).2 Earnhart 
testified that there is no discretion for YDC employees 
under this law; notification of any allegation of or 
information about abuse must go to Liggett. Liggett is then 
responsible for initiating an investigation into the alleged 
abuse. Part of the process of such an investigation includes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Title 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 6311 pr ovides in pertinent part: 
 
       S 6311. Persons required to r eport suspected child abuse 
 
        (a) General rule.--Persons who, in the course of their employment, 
       occupation or practice of their profession, come into contact with 
       children shall report or cause a r eport to be made in accordance 
       with section 6313 (relating to reporting procedure) when they have 
       reasonable cause to suspect, on the basis of their medical, 
       professional or other training and experience, that a child coming 
       before them in their professional or official capacity is an abused 
       child. . . . 
 
        (b) Enumeration of persons required to report.--Persons required 
       to report under subsection (a) include, but ar e not limited to, 
any 
       . . . school administrator, school teacher , school nurse, social 
       services worker, day-care center worker or any other child-care or 
       foster-care worker, mental health professional, peace officer or 
law 
       enforcement official. 
 
        (c) Staff members of institutions, etc.--Whenever a person is 
       required to report under subsection (b) in the capacity as a member 
       of the staff of a medical or other public or private institution, 
school, 
       facility or agency, that person shall immediately notify the person 
in 
       charge of the institution, school, facility or agency or the 
designated 
       agent of the person in charge. Upon notification, the person in 
       charge or the designated agent, if any, shall assume the 
       responsibility and have the legal obligation to report or cause a 
       report to be made in accordance with section 6313. This chapter 
       does not require more than one r eport from any such institution, 
       school, facility or agency. 
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sending notification of the alleged abuse within 24 hours to 
Child Line, a hotline for child abuse allegations. 3 
 
Because this is an appeal of a grant of summary 
judgment, we must review the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom summary judgment 
was entered. See Pi Lambda Phi Frater nity, Inc. v. University 
of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000). We 
therefore accept as true for the purposes of this appeal the 
plaintiffs' description of: (1) the abuse they suffered at YDC; 
(2) relevant abuse suffered by other residents; and (3) the 
actions and reactions of YDC staff when they were notified 
of such abuse. 
 
A. The Abuse Suffered by Beers-Capitol 
 
Beers-Capitol was 17 years old when she was 
incarcerated at YDC New Castle from February 3, 1994 to 
March 30, 1994. Whetzel started making sexual comments 
to Beers-Capitol a few weeks after she arrived. This 
escalated into Whetzel inappropriately touching Beers- 
Capitol in various public places at YDC. Whetzel then 
began waking Beers-Capitol up in the middle of the night to 
bring her into his office to molest her and ask her to have 
sex with him. When she refused, he took away her 
privileges. Beers-Capitol eventually had sex with Whetzel 
about a week or so before she was released, and she then 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Notwithstanding this training, there is evidence in the record that YDC 
employees viewed claims made by residents with skepticism. Michael 
Pogozelec, a counselor at YDC who is not a party in this case, testified 
in his deposition that 
 
       kids there [at YDC] are extr emely manipulative. When they come in, 
       they're used to getting their way any way they can out there on the 
       streets. . . . [A]ll of them came fr om homes that were highly 
       dysfunctional where they had to survive themselves either by 
       scheming, manipulating, intimidating, game-playing. So, staff 
       question things right off the bat. They don't believe everything 
that 
       a student brings to their attention. 
 
That this attitude was widespread at YDC is supported by a comment 
defendant Flecher made to Robert McLean, an investigator hired by 
Liggett to look into allegations of abuse by Whetzel. Flecher told McLean 
that "these types of accusations [of sexual abuse] occur on a frequent 
basis when female students become angry or upset with staff members." 
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came to the conclusion that he had gotten her pr egnant. 
On the day before she was released fr om YDC, Beers- 
Capitol was cleaning the unit's canteen with defendant 
Shirley Robinson; at that time, she told Robinson that she 
had had sex with Whetzel and that she believed Whetzel 
had gotten her pregnant. Robinson did not believe that 
Beers-Capitol was serious in her allegation and r esponded 
by saying, "Well, you know that you can get in trouble 
making accusations like that." 
 
In her deposition, Robinson stated that, although 
originally she did not believe Beers-Capitol's allegation, the 
accusation "nagged" her because she knew that any 
allegation had to be reported. She thus r eported the 
accusation to Earnhart the next day and wr ote up an 
incident report. According to Robinson's deposition, the 
following day Earnhart called Beers-Capitol, who had been 
released by then, at her home in Erie, Pennsylvania, to 
check on the story, whereupon Beers-Capitol denied the 
accusation. However, according to Ear nhart's deposition, 
Robinson delayed for a longer period, possibly up to three 
weeks, before informing Earnhart of the allegation, and at 
that point Earnhart asked defendant Flecher to call Beers- 
Capitol at home about the allegation, and Flecher did so at 
that time.4 Beers-Capitol testified that someone from YDC 
called her at some point after her release and asked, "Amie, 
we have accusations we know Barry did not do. I need to 
ask you, did you have sex with him?" Beers-Capitol denied 
having sex with Whetzel. 
 
Robinson, Earnhart, and Flecher did not r eport Beers- 
Capitol's allegation to Liggett as requir ed by 23 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. S 6311. Earnhart did check with the Medical 
Department and was informed that Beers-Capitol had had 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Earnhart's testimony on this issue is somewhat confused. His first 
response was that he did not think Robinson delayed three weeks in 
reporting the allegation to him, but when confr onted with the fact that 
Flecher's file notes show that the phone call to Beers-Capitol was made 
three weeks after Beers-Capitol made her allegation, he seems to imply 
that Robinson did in fact delay her report of the allegation for three 
weeks. Beers-Capitol's deposition is unclear as to who called her and 
when, except that the caller was a male YDC employee and that the call 
was shortly after her release. 
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a pregnancy test on March 21, and that the results of the 
test were negative. Of course, a negative pr egnancy test on 
March 21 is consistent with Whetzel impr egnating Beers- 
Capitol about a week or so before her r elease on March 30. 
According to her deposition, Beers-Capitol did not want her 
boyfriend at the time of her release (now her husband) to 
find out that Whetzel had impregnated her , so she had sex 
with her boyfriend soon following her release. Nine months 
later, she gave birth to a son, whom she and her husband 
have raised as their child. Although Beers-Capitol has 
never had a paternity test done, she seems to be convinced 
that Whetzel is her son's biological father. 
 
B. The Abuse Suffered by T ate  
 
Aliya Tate was incarcerated at YDC fr om June 13, 1991 
through May 4, 1993 and from July 12, 1994 to March 28, 
1995. In November 1994, when she was 16, Tate was in a 
counseling session with Whetzel in Whetzel's back office 
discussing Tate's past sexual abuse, wher eupon Whetzel 
began to rub Tate's leg and lower thigh. On several other 
occasions in November and December 1994 and January 
1995 Whetzel attempted to kiss Tate and touch her 
genitals. On the night of December 12, Whetzel tried to 
touch Tate inappropriately while they wer e alone in Unit 7's 
TV room, but Tate immediately left the r oom. At around 
this time, two other students reported (falsely, according to 
Tate) that Tate and Whetzel had had sex in the TV room on 
December 12. This allegation was reported to Liggett, who 
assigned Robert McLean to investigate. Tate testified that 
Whetzel threatened that he would lengthen her stay at YDC 
if she told anyone what he had done, so Tate gave McLean 
a sworn statement that nothing had occurr ed between her 
and Whetzel. 
 
Finally, on January 29, 1995 Whetzel corner ed Tate in 
the back office at the unit, prevented her fr om leaving, 
grabbed her, kissed her, put his hands down her pants and 
then tried to pick her up and lick her chest. After this 
incident, Tate wrote up a Student Incident Report (SIR) 
complaining of Whetzel's behavior that evening along with 
the previous incidents and gave it to the duty officer. The 
duty officer then notified Earnhart of the allegation. The 
next day, Tate talked to Nora Burley about the previous 
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day's incident as well as all the past incidents with Whetzel, 
at which time, according to Tate's deposition, Burley said to 
her that "she kind of knew he was messing with students 
but she didn't know that he was messing with me." 
 
As a result of Tate's filing of the SIR, Liggett instituted an 
investigation, and YDC notified Child Line. Child Line in 
turn notified the Pennsylvania State Police which initiated 
its own investigation into Whetzel's conduct, eventually 
resulting in Whetzel's criminal conviction. In the course of 
their investigation the police found two other for mer 
residents of YDC who had been sexually assaulted by 
Whetzel: Melissa Guyaux and Tina McAfee. 
 
C. Relevant Abuse of Other Residents 
 
Melissa Guyaux was at YDC from August 1992 to July 
1993. Guyaux testified at Whetzel's criminal trial that she 
had had sex with Whetzel on many occasions during her 
time at YDC. Guyaux stated that Whetzel often came into 
her room in the middle of the night, took her to the 
canteen, and even took her out of school in the middle of 
the day to have sex with her. In March 1993 it came to 
Nora Burley's attention that another YDC resident alleged 
that Whetzel and Guyaux were having sex. Burley set up a 
meeting to investigate these allegations. Whetzel br ought 
Guyaux to the meeting and threatened her en r oute, saying 
that he would extend her stay at YDC if she said anything. 
Guyaux thus denied having sex with Whetzel at the 
meeting; Liggett was not notified of the allegation. 
 
Tina McAfee was at YDC from May 1994 to February 
1995. During this time, Whetzel counseled McAfee about 
her previous sexual abuse as a child. At one session, while 
McAffee was talking about past instances of rape and 
abuse, Whetzel asked her if it felt good and pointed to her 
vagina. Subsequently, Whetzel would wake McAfee in the 
middle of the night to have sex with her. On a couple of 
occasions, Flecher became aware of rumors that Whetzel 
was having sex with McAfee (one of the times it was 
Whetzel himself who approached Flecher, expressing 
"concern" over these "rumors"). Flecher twice talked to 
McAfee about these allegations, but she denied them both 
times. Flecher never informed Liggett about the allegations. 
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Finally, during his investigation of the reports that Tate 
and Whetzel had sex on Decemeber 12, 1994, investigator 
Robert McLean learned from Flecher that another female 
resident of YDC, Jochabed Good, had told a judge in mid- 
1994 that "YDC was unsafe and `some staf f members at the 
YDC are having sex with students.' " It is not clear from the 
record when Flecher became aware of Good's allegation, or 
what Flecher did in response. 
 
D. Procedural History 
 
The plaintiffs brought suit in the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, 
alleging that they were subjected to cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution because they were sexually 
assaulted by Whetzel while incarcerated at YDC. 5 All of the 
defendants except Whetzel moved for summary judgment. 
In deciding this motion, the District Court applied the two- 
part test from Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994), for 
finding an Eighth Amendment violation by a prison official: 
(1) a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation; and (2) 
deliberate indifference by the prison official-defendants. 
 
As noted above, it is not disputed that the sexual abuse 
suffered by the plaintiffs was sufficiently serious to support 
an Eighth Amendment claim, so the key issue in the case 
is whether the defendants exhibited deliberate indif ference 
to the plaintiffs' health or safety. The District Court granted 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding 
that the plaintiffs had not "demonstrated a triable issue of 
fact as to whether any of the moving defendants wer e 
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to [the] 
plaintiffs' rights." D. Ct. Mem. Op. at 8. This timely appeal 
followed. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. SS 1331 & 1343, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The plaintiffs also originally br ought claims under the Fourth, Ninth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court r ejected these claims 
because it concluded that an Eighth Amendment analysis was the 
proper one to use for claims arising fr om incarceration in a facility for 
juvenile offenders. See Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 7. The plaintiffs do not 
press these other claims on appeal. 
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to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We set forth the familiar standard of 
review of grants of summary judgment in the mar gin.6 
 
II. Discussion 
 
Because this case turns on the plaintif fs' claims of 
deliberate indifference, we begin our analysis with an 
examination of the Supreme Court and Thir d Circuit 
jurisprudence on deliberate indifference in the context of an 
Eighth Amendment prison conditions claim. We then apply 
this analytical structure to the plaintif fs' claims against 
each of the defendants. 
 
A. The Law on Deliberate Indiffer ence in a Prison 
       Conditions Case 
 
1. 
 
The leading Supreme Court case setting forth the Eighth 
Amendment deliberate indifference analysis for a prison 
conditions case is Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
In Farmer, the Supreme Court r eversed a grant of summary 
judgment for various defendant prison officials on the 
plaintiff 's Eighth Amendment claim, which was based on 
the deliberate indifference that the officials allegedly 
showed to his risk of being sexually assaulted in prison. In 
its analysis on what type of showing is needed to establish 
deliberate indifference by a defendant, Farmer rejected an 
objective test for deliberate indiffer ence; instead it looked to 
what the prison official actually knew rather than what a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We exercise plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary 
judgment and review the facts in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom summary judgment was entered. See Pi Lambda Phi 
Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 441 n.3 (3d 
Cir. 
2000). Summary judgment is proper if ther e is no genuine issue of 
material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. See F.R.C.P. 56(c);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the 
evidence and determine the truth of the matter , but to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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reasonable official in his position should have known. More 
specifically, the Court held that "a prison official cannot be 
found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an 
inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the 
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety." Id. at 837. 
 
This requirement of actual knowledge means that "the 
official must both be aware of facts fr om which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious 
harm exists, and he must also draw the infer ence." Id. 
Farmer explained, however, that this subjective knowledge 
requirement does not mean that a prison official can avoid 
liability by remaining deliberately indif ferent to an excessive 
or substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners: 
 
       We are no more persuaded by petitioner's argument 
       that, without an objective test for deliberate 
       indifference, prison officials will be free to ignore 
       obvious dangers to inmates. Under the test we adopt 
       today, an Eighth Amendment claimant need not show 
       that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that 
       harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that 
       the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge 
       of a substantial risk of serious harm. 
 
Id. at 842. 
 
Moreover, a defendant's knowledge of a risk can be 
proved indirectly by circumstantial evidence. "[A] factfinder 
may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial 
risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." Id. (citing 
Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr ., Substantive 
Criminal Law S 3.7, p. 335 (1986) ("[I]f the risk is obvious, 
so that a reasonable man would realize it, we might well 
infer that [the defendant] did in fact r ealize it. . . .")). In 
fact, Farmer anticipated that a plaintiff could make out a 
deliberate indifference case by showing that prison officials 
simply were aware of a general risk to inmates in the 
plaintiff 's situation: 
 
       [I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff pr esents evidence 
       showing that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was 
       longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expr essly 
       noted by prison officials in the past, and the 
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       circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being 
       sued had been exposed to information concer ning the 
       risk and thus must have known about it, then such 
       evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to 
       find that the defendant-official had actual knowledge of 
       the risk. 
 
Id. at 842-43 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Similarly, Farmer made clear that a prison official 
defendant cannot escape liability by showing that he did 
not know that this particular inmate was in danger of 
attack: "it does not matter . . . whether a prisoner faces an 
excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or 
because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk." Id. 
at 843. 
 
Farmer emphasized further that, while a prison official's 
knowledge of an excessive risk of serious har m may be 
inferred from the fact that the risk is obvious, this inference 
is not compelled, as the official always must have an 
opportunity to show that he was unaware of the risk. See 
id. at 844. Finally, the official who is actually aware of the 
risk to the prisoner can avert liability by showing that he 
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the ultimate harm 
was not avoided. See id. 
 
The Court in Farmer also discussed the showing that a 
plaintiff needs to make to survive a summary judgment 
motion on a deliberate indifference claim. Although this 
discussion was in the context of a claim for an injunction, 
it may be applied to a claim for damages. The Court stated 
that "to survive summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must 
come forward with evidence from which it can be inferred 
that the defendant-officials were at the time suit was filed, 
and are at the time of summary judgment, knowingly and 
unreasonably disregarding an objectively intolerable risk of 
harm." Id. at 846. We r ead this discussion in Farmer to 
mean that, to defeat the summary judgment motion, Beers- 
Capitol and Tate must present enough evidence to support 
the inference that the defendants "knowingly and 
unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of 
harm." 
 
Our decision in Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F .3d 742 (3d Cir. 
1997), is instructive because it applies Far mer's deliberate 
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indifference test to a situation somewhat similar to the case 
at bar. In Hamilton, a prisoner br ought an Eighth 
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against certain 
prison officials, alleging that the officials were deliberately 
indifferent to the risk to his safety posed by other inmates 
when they transferred him to a certain Delawar e state 
prison. Plaintiff Hamilton had been attacked and seriously 
injured by other inmates at this prison. The court granted 
summary judgment for Lewis, the prison official who was in 
charge of prisoner transfers, on the basis of Lewis's affidavit 
that she did not know of any risk posed to Hamilton by the 
transfer. The district court granted summary judgment to 
the other defendants, who were members of the prison 
system's "Multi-Disciplinary Team" (MDT), because the 
court concluded that the MDT had acted reasonably and 
"did everything they could" after they lear ned of the risk to 
Hamilton (the MDT had recommended that Hamilton be 
placed in protective custody at the prison before he was 
attacked). Id. at 748. We reversed. 
 
First, we noted that Hamilton had presented sufficient 
circumstantial evidence that Lewis was awar e of the risk 
posed to Hamilton to survive summary judgment: Lewis 
had probably received the MDT recommendation (she did 
not deny this); Lewis knew that Hamilton was a prison 
informant and thus was more likely to be harmed by other 
inmates; and Lewis herself had approved pr otective custody 
for Hamilton on two prior occasions. See id. at 747. We held 
that this proffered evidence was similar to the type of 
circumstantial evidence anticipated as sufficient by Farmer, 
i.e., it was sufficient evidence "upon which a factfinder 
could conclude that Lewis `must have known' of the risk to 
Hamilton's safety." Id. at 748 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
842). Second, we reversed the grant of summary judgment 
for the MDT defendants because Hamilton demonstrated 
that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether these 
defendants could have done something more than merely 
offer a recommendation; for example, they could have 
placed Hamilton in administrative segregation. We thus 
held that "there remains a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the MDT's response to the risk Hamilton 
faced was reasonable." Id. 
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From Farmer and Hamilton we extract the following 
precepts. To be liable on a deliberate indifference claim, a 
defendant prison official must both "know[ ] of and 
disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." 
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The knowledge element of 
deliberate indifference is subjective, not objective 
knowledge, meaning that the official must actually be aware 
of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that 
the official should have been aware. See id. at 837-38. 
However, subjective knowledge on the part of the official 
can be proved by circumstantial evidence to the effect that 
the excessive risk was so obvious that the official must 
have known of the risk. See id. at 842. Finally, a defendant 
can rebut a prima facie demonstration of deliberate 
indifference either by establishing that he did not have the 
requisite level of knowledge or awareness of the risk, or 
that, although he did know of the risk, he took r easonable 
steps to prevent the harm from occurring. See id. at 844. 
 
2. 
 
The plaintiffs' theory as to how the defendants' actions 
and inactions constitute deliberate indiffer ence proceeds 
along two basic lines. First, the plaintiffs contend that some 
of the defendants knew of the abuse committed by Whetzel 
or were aware of the high risk of abuse, but declined to act 
or to seek more information about it. Second, the plaintiffs 
also claim that the supervisor defendants, while per haps 
not aware of the particular risk that Whetzel posed to these 
specific plaintiffs, implemented policies that were so 
defective that they created an unreasonable and excessive 
risk of abuse to the female residents generally at YDC, and 
that the defendants were aware of this risk. 
 
Both of these approaches depend upon the thesis that all 
of the defendants were trained experts in the area of 
juvenile detention, so that, given what they knew, they 
must have been aware of the excessive risks of harm to the 
plaintiffs that existed at YDC. In particular , the plaintiffs 
contend that those defendants who were r esponsible for 
implementing the policies at YDC had to know that the 
policies and procedures at YDC created substantial general 
risks of sexual abuse for the female residents there, as 
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these defendants were trained how to minimize those risks. 
The plaintiffs assert further that those defendants who 
worked directly with the female residents had to know of 
the particular risk that Whetzel posed because they were 
trained to recognize cases of sexual abuse and they were 
aware of persistent allegations of his sexual r elationships 
with the residents. 
 
The deliberate indifference claims implicating supervisors 
for their deficient policies are more complicated than the 
other, more direct deliberate indif ference claims, because 
the former add another level to the analysis. Both the 
plaintiffs and the defendants argue that we should analyze 
the supervisor-centered claims under the four-part test for 
supervisor liability developed in Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 
1099 (3d Cir. 1989).7 Sample involved a claim that a 
supervisor was liable for a subordinate's Eighth 
Amendment violation because the supervisor implemented 
deficient policies and was deliberately indif ferent to the risk 
these policies generated. Although the claim in Sample does 
not seem to be precisely the same as the plaintiffs' claim in 
the case at bar--Sample concerned whether a supervisor 
could be liable for a subordinate's Eighth Amendment tort 
while the plaintiffs here seem to claim that the supervisors 
committed their own Eighth Amendment violations by 
implementing defective policies--we do not think this 
difference material. 
 
In Sample, the plaintiff (Sample) had his life sentence for 
murder vacated by the Pennsylvania Supr eme Court, and 
was granted bail pending the new trial. Although his family 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Although Sample was decided before Farmer, nothing in the Sample 
opinion that we rely on here conflicts with Farmer. Indeed, we have used 
parts of Sample's analysis of supervisor liability on a deliberate 
indifference claim in at least one case after Farmer. See Carter v. City 
of 
Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 356-357 & n.61 (3d Cir. 1999). District 
courts in this circuit have also applied the Sample four-part test for 
determining supervisor liability on deliberate indifference claims after 
Farmer. See, e.g., Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228- 
29 (D.N.J. 2000); Burch v. Reeves, 1999 WL 1285815 at *2-*3 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 20, 1999); Carrigan v. Delaware, 957 F. Supp. 1376, 1382-83 (D. 
Del. 1997); Wagner v. Pennsylvania, 937 F. Supp. 510, 516 (W.D. Pa. 
1995). 
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was ready to post bail, the senior recor ds officer (Diecks) 
determined that Sample still had time to serve on another 
sentence. In fact, Diecks was mistaken, and by the time 
this mistake was rectified, Sample had served an additional 
nine months. Sample sued Diecks and William Robinson, 
the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Corrections. Diecks was found liable for an Eighth 
Amendment violation for his deliberate indif ference. The 
apposite precedent concerns the question whether 
Robinson was liable on the Eighth Amendment claim, as 
Diecks' supervisor, for failing to pr operly supervise and 
implement policies and practices that would have pr otected 
against the constitutional violation. 
 
Presented with these facts, we developed a four -part test, 
based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Canton 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), for supervisor liability on an 
Eighth Amendment claim for failure to pr operly supervise. 
Under this regime, to hold a supervisor liable because his 
policies or practices led to an Eighth Amendment violation, 
the plaintiff must identify a specific policy or practice that 
the supervisor failed to employ and show that: (1) the 
existing policy or practice created an unr easonable risk of 
the Eighth Amendment injury; (2) the supervisor was aware 
that the unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor 
was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the injury resulted from 
the policy or practice. See Sample, 885 F .2d at 1118. 
 
According to Sample, one way--per haps the easiest way-- 
a plaintiff can make out a supervisor liability claim is by 
showing that "the supervisory official failed to respond 
appropriately in the face of an awareness of a pattern of 
such injuries." Id. But that is not the only way to make out 
such a claim, as "there are situations in which the risk of 
constitutionally cognizable harm is so gr eat and so obvious 
that the risk and the failure of supervisory officials to 
respond will alone support findings of the existence of an 
unreasonable risk, of knowledge of that unr easonable risk, 
and of indifference to it." Id.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 
1989), used a test similar to Sample's in considering a claim made under 
the second method of showing deliberate indif ference (existence of "so 
 
                                18 
 
 
 
In sum, to make out a claim of deliberate indif ference 
based on direct liability (i.e., insofar as the defendants are 
alleged to have known of and ignored the particular risk 
that Whetzel posed), the plaintiffs must meet the test from 
Farmer v. Brennan: They must show that the defendants 
knew or were aware of and disregar ded an excessive risk to 
the plaintiffs' health or safety, and they can show this by 
establishing that the risk was obvious. For the plaintiffs' 
claims seeking to hold supervisors liable for their deficient 
policies, Sample's four-part test pr ovides the analytical 
structure for determining whether the policymakers 
exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' risk of 
injury, it being simply the deliberate indif ference test 
applied to the specific situation of a policymaker . 
 
B. The Allegations Against the Defendants: Applying The 
       Test 
 
1. Robert Liggett, Executive Director of YDC 
 
As the Executive Director of YDC, Liggett has ultimate 
responsibility for the overall operation of YDC. His duties 
include managing YDC's daily operation, supervising and 
training the staff, and formulating and implementing all 
operational policies, regulations, and practices. The 
plaintiffs concede that Liggett did not have actual 
knowledge of Whetzel's abuse of the plaintif fs, nor of the 
specific risk that Whetzel posed to the plaintif fs, until after 
the fact. Instead, the plaintiffs level a claim of supervisor 
liability against Liggett, contending that the policies and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
great and so obvious" a risk). In Stoneking, the plaintiff, a student in 
the 
Bradford school district, sought to hold the school district and its 
officials liable for a teacher's sexual assault on her, on the theory that 
the school district and officials maintained a practice, custom, or policy 
of deliberate indifference to instances of known or suspected sexual 
abuse by teachers. Stoneking, like Sample, followed the reasoning of City 
of Canton, and held that "if the need for mor e or different training is 
so 
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of 
constitutional rights, `the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to 
have been deliberately indifferent to the need.' " Id. at 725 (quoting 
City 
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). 
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procedures that Liggett implemented and approved created 
an unreasonably unsafe environment at YDC that allowed 
Whetzel to commit his abuse over an extended period, and 
that Liggett knew that his policies were deficient in this 
way. 
 
The plaintiffs' allegations of Liggett's policymaking 
inadequacies fall into three categories: (1) the failure to 
follow accepted standards for the basic structure and 
staffing of juvenile residential facilities; (2) the failure to 
properly train staff to recognize child abuse; and (3) the 
promulgation of de facto policies and the failure to 
implement other policies, ultimately leading to the stifling of 
complaints of abuse and incompetent investigations of the 
complaints that were made. The plaintif fs' expert, John 
Cocoros (a consultant with extensive experience in the field 
of residential facilities for delinquent youths), opined in a 
written report prepared for the plaintiffs that these 
deficiencies created a situation in which YDC failed to have 
"basic precepts of institutional management without which 
no administrator can claim to operate a facility which 
provides safety and security for its staf f and residents," 
thus "unnecessarily plac[ing] juveniles at high risk for 
abuse at the hands of staff " and "cr eating an environment 
in which eventual abuse was virtually predictable." 
 
Regarding the first area of allegedly deficient 
policymaking by Liggett, the plaintiffs point to five 
inadequacies with the basic structure of YDC: (1) YDC did 
not require that a female staff member be present at all 
times in the female units, in contravention of the American 
Correctional Association's Standards for Juvenile Training 
Schools No. 3-JTS-3A-07; (2) there was poor or nonexistent 
supervision of the staff at night (when Whetzel committed 
many of his abuses); (3) YDC had no observation or 
surveillance system (thus ensuring that Whetzel could take 
female residents to areas where they would be unobserved); 
(4) YDC permitted private, unsupervised interactions 
between male staff and female residents; and (5) YDC 
permitted unsupervised trips off-gr ounds by female 
residents solely accompanied by male staf f. 
 
With respect to the failure of staf f training, the plaintiffs 
contend that, despite rules that requir ed and staff training 
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that emphasized that all allegations of abuse be r eported, 
Liggett allowed staff members to decide on their own 
whether to report an allegation. Because the allegations 
against Whetzel were reported to dif ferent staff members, 
many of whom did not report those allegations to Liggett, 
no one person knew the extent of the allegations against 
Whetzel. In their brief, the plaintiffs list seven different 
employees who were aware of differ ent allegations against 
Whetzel but who did not report these allegations to Liggett. 
See Pls.' Br. at 24 n.8. The plaintif fs argue that Liggett's 
failure to have any sort of review pr ocedure in place to 
determine whether the notification policy was being 
followed, along with his failure to discipline these 
employees after this information came out or to train them 
properly in the first place, were serious policy deficiencies 
that, according to Cocoros, led to the cr eation of a staff 
subculture in which a staff member's abuses could go 
unaddressed. 
 
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that Liggett's policies failed to 
provide the juveniles under his care with multiple and 
easily accessible opportunities for them to r eport abuse. 
They contend that any reports of abuse that wer e made 
were incompetently investigated under Liggett's overall 
supervision. According to the plaintiffs, Liggett's policies 
allowed his staff to respond to initial allegations with 
threats (Robinson, Whetzel) and confrontation (Earnhart). 
When a report did reach Liggett, he is alleged either to have 
failed to initiate an investigation (as with Jocheded Good's 
allegation),9 or to have initiated inadequate investigations 
(as with the two Tate allegations, both of which were 
determined by YDC to be unfounded although the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. At one point in their brief, the plaintif fs claim that Liggett knew 
about 
Good's allegation, but in another section they assert that Flecher failed 
to notify Liggett of Good's allegation. See Pls.' Br. at 24, 32. The 
implication of the plaintiffs' claim that Flecher did not inform Liggett 
of 
the allegation is that Flecher knew of the allegation but Liggett did not; 
thus, the plaintiffs' claims here may be inconsistent. Because we must 
draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party in a review of a 
summary judgment motion, we conclude for the purposes of this appeal 
that Flecher did not inform Liggett of Good's allegation but that Liggett 
learned of it through some other means. 
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Pennsylvania state police determined them to be true in its 
investigation). 
 
Because we are reviewing the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment, we take the above allegations to be 
true and we must now consider whether they ar e legally 
sufficient to support a claim of deliberate indif ference past 
the summary judgment stage. More specifically, the 
relevant issue is whether the above-described policymaking 
inadequacies raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the four-part test for deliberate indifference from 
Sample is met. As we noted above, Sample provides two 
methods of meeting this test: (i) showing that the 
supervisor failed to adequately respond to a pattern of past 
occurrences of injuries like the plaintif fs', or (ii) showing 
that the risk of constitutionally cognizable har m was "so 
great and so obvious that the risk and the failure of 
supervisory officials to respond will alone" support finding 
that the four-part test is met. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 
1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
We conclude that the plaintiffs have not met their burden 
of showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether Liggett exhibited deliberate indif ference in his 
policymaking. Considering the first method of meeting the 
Sample test, the plaintiffs have not shown that Liggett was 
aware of a "pattern" of sexual assaults being committed by 
YDC employees. See id. At most, they have alleged that 
Liggett was aware of Good's allegation and that he was 
aware of two allegations regarding T ate. Such knowledge 
cannot benefit Beers-Capitol in her claim against Liggett 
because the behavior described in the allegations occurred 
after her abuse, and a successful deliberate indif ference 
claim requires showing that the defendant knew of the risk 
to the plaintiff before the plaintiff 's injury occurred. See 
Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a plaintiff cannot make out a deliberate 
indifference claim against prison officials for a prison attack 
when the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendants 
knew of the attack afterwards but presented no evidence 
that defendants knew of the risk to the defendant before 
the attack). Because Whetzel's abuse of Beers-Capitol 
occurred approximately eight months befor e Whetzel's 
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abuse of Tate, some evidence of the defendants' awareness 
of Whetzel's activities is available to Tate but not Beers- 
Capitol. 
 
Tate could argue that Liggett knew of Good's allegation 
and her first allegation before her final abuse had occurred, 
but we do not believe that two allegations constitute a 
"pattern of past occurrences" as contemplated by Sample. 
Furthermore, even if two instances is a pattern, this is not 
a pattern of known injuries, but a pattern of known 
allegations, which is quite differ ent; they are known to be 
injuries now, but it is what Liggett knew at the time, not 
what he knows now, that is material. 
 
The plaintiffs concentrate their argument on the second 
method of meeting the Sample test--the existence of "so 
great and so obvious" a risk, which is alleged to have arisen 
as a result of deficient policies and practices that were in 
place before the attacks on Beers-Capitol. T o make their 
argument, the plaintiffs point to Cocor os's conclusion that 
YDC's administration showed "reckless disr egard for the 
safety of residents." This conclusion is suf fused with legal 
considerations, and it is our province to deter mine whether 
the factual conclusions in Cocoros's report support the 
legal conclusion of deliberate indiffer ence. The report shows 
that YDC did not implement a number of policies that were 
standard or recommended in the juvenile detention field, 
and that YDC's policies and procedures could have been 
better. We note in passing that the r eport, if accurate, is an 
indictment of the administration of the YDC by Liggett and 
the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfar e. Most 
importantly, the plaintiffs argue for cefully that Liggett's 
policymaking created an "institutional mindset" that 
allowed Whetzel's abuse to go on for as long as it did. 
 
The deliberate indifference standar d as set out in Farmer 
is a high one, however--requiring actual knowledge or 
awareness on the part of the defendant--and the plaintiffs' 
evidence here is not sufficient to cr eate a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the above policies and practices 
created a risk of harm to the plaintif fs that was "so great 
and so obvious" that Liggett must have known of the 
excessive risk but was indifferent to it. Although Cocoros's 
report does seem to raise a genuine issue as to Liggett's 
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negligence, it is not "evidence from which it can be inferred" 
that Liggett "knowingly and unreasonably disregard[ed] an 
objectively intolerable risk of harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
846; see also Steele v. Choi, 82 F.3d 175, 179 (7th Cir. 
1996) (holding that evidence that a minimally competent 
doctor would have treated the plaintiff prisoner correctly 
while the defendant doctor did not is insufficient under 
Farmer to survive the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment in a deliberate indifference case). 
 
As we have explained, using circumstantial evidence to 
prove deliberate indifference r equires more than evidence 
that the defendants should have recognized the excessive 
risk and responded to it; it requir es evidence that the 
defendant must have recognized the excessive risk and 
ignored it. The plaintiff 's evidence may raise an issue of 
material fact as to the former but it does not for the latter. 
We therefore will affirm the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment for Liggett. 
 
2. Charles Earnhart, Director of Unit 7 
 
Earnhart was the unit director of Unit 7 during the 
relevant time period, responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of Unit 7, which included supervising the staff of 
the unit and reviewing and evaluating r eports and 
scheduled work. Earnhart directly supervised the unit 
managers, meeting with these managers daily. 
 
The plaintiffs' deliberate indiffer ence claims against 
Earnhart involve a combination of direct and supervisor 
liability. First, the plaintiffs assert that Earnhart 
participated in formulating and implementing the policy 
that allowed the night shift in the female r esidents' unit to 
be without a female staff member, as well as the policy 
permitting unsupervised male staff to take female residents 
off-grounds. The analysis of this claim of deliberate 
indifference proceeds along the same lines as outlined 
above for Liggett (with the four-part test fr om Sample), but 
this supervisory-based claim is weaker than the one against 
Liggett that we rejected above. As to whether Earnhart was 
aware of a pattern of past injuries, the facts as alleged only 
support the conclusion that he knew of Beers-Capitol's 
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allegation, and one incident does not a patter n make. As to 
the "so great and so obvious a risk" method of meeting 
Sample's test, the analysis begins and ends just as it did 
for Liggett. In fact, because Earnhart's supervisory 
responsibility at YDC was not as great as Liggett's, there is 
less evidence that Earnhart's policies cr eated a risk that 
was "so great and so obvious" that he must have known of 
the excessive risk but was indifferent to it. For these 
reasons, the plaintiffs' claims of deliberate indifference 
against Earnhart based on supervisor liability cannot 
survive summary judgment. 
 
The plaintiffs also submit that Earnhart directly 
exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' injuries 
through two other actions: (1) by failing to discipline 
Robinson for delaying her reporting of Beers-Capitol's 
allegation of abuse; and (2) by mishandling Beers-Capitol's 
allegation, in that (a) Earnhart did not r eport it to Liggett 
(as required by law); and (b) Earnhart "undertook a wholly 
inadequate investigation," namely, merely calling Beers- 
Capitol at home and asking her over the phone if the abuse 
occurred.10 
 
We note first that Beers-Capitol cannot use the above two 
actions to support her claim that Earnhart was aware of 
the risk of abuse to her because these actions took place 
after Beers-Capitol's abuse. In the absence of any other 
evidence that Earnhart was aware of an excessive risk to 
Beers-Capitol, Beers-Capitol cannot make out a dir ect 
deliberate indifference claim against Ear nhart. See Lewis v. 
Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
However, Tate can claim that Ear nhart's actions 
surrounding Beers-Capitol's abuse (which occurr ed before 
the abuse Tate suffered) ar e evidence that, by the time of 
Tate's abuse, Earnhart was aware of but ignored the 
excessive risk to the female residents posed by Whetzel. We 
nonetheless conclude that this evidence is insufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Earnhart was deliberately indiffer ent. It is not apparent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although it is unclear from the r ecord whether Earnhart called 
Beers-Capitol himself or had Flecher call Beers-Capitol, see supra page 
8 & note 4, this does not affect our analysis. 
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how Earnhart's failure to discipline Robinson for her brief 
delay in reporting Beers-Capitol's allegation demonstrates 
that Earnhart was deliberately indiffer ent to a risk to Tate. 
Furthermore, although Earnhart pr obably should have 
better handled the investigation into Beers-Capitol's 
allegation, this lapse is not nearly enough to clear the high 
bar set by Farmer: raising an infer ence that he "knowingly 
and unreasonably disregard[ed] an objectively intolerable 
risk of harm." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846. We therefore will 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment for 
Earnhart. 
 
3. Joseph Flecher, Manager of Unit 7 
 
Flecher was the unit manager for Unit 7 during the 
relevant time period. Unit managers are r esponsible for 
developing, coordinating, and administering pr ogram 
services for their unit; they also directly supervise the 
cottage supervisors within their unit. As with Ear nhart, the 
plaintiffs' claims of Flecher's deliberate indifference 
combine direct and supervisor liability. First, the plaintiffs 
claim that Flecher failed to adequately train the staff under 
him to recognize abuse. Second (and relatedly), plaintiffs 
assert that Flecher carried out a de facto policy of failing to 
notify Liggett of allegations of abuse and of disbelieving 
such allegations when they were presented to him, because, 
as Flecher stated to Investigator McLean, "these types of 
accusations occur on a frequent basis when female 
students become upset or angry with staff members." The 
plaintiffs also have presented evidence that supports a 
claim of direct liability against Flecher , namely that, in the 
time period before Tate's abuse but after Beers-Capitol's, 
Flecher had notice of, but did not adequately r espond to, 
Whetzel's abusive activities.11  The evidence is: (1) Flecher's 
failure to notify Liggett of Beers-Capitol's allegations; (2) 
Flecher's failure to notify Liggett of Good's allegations; (3) 
Flecher's failure to notify Liggett of McAfee's allegations; (4) 
Flecher's failure to make any recor ding of McAfee's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. As above, this evidence only supports T ate's claim against Flecher, 
not Beers-Capitol's, because all of these actions occurred after Beers- 
Capitol's abuse. 
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allegations; and (5) Flecher's failure to conduct adequate 
investigations of Beers-Capitol's, McAfee's, and Good's 
allegations. 
 
Of the three supervisor defendants (Liggett, Earnhart, 
and Flecher), Flecher appears to be the one who had the 
most information about what was going on with Whetzel. 
Furthermore, because he was the manager of Unit 7, 
Flecher was in a position both to conduct investigations 
into Whetzel's behavior and to inform Liggett of any 
problems and allegations regarding Whetzel. The plaintiffs 
argue that the combination of Flecher's knowledge of the 
allegations against Whetzel, Flecher's failur e to follow YDC 
procedures and Pennsylvania law in not notifying Liggett of 
these allegations, and Flecher's own inadequate 
investigations of the allegations together cr eate a genuine 
issue of fact as to Flecher's deliberate indif ference. 
Although there is no direct evidence that Flecher was aware 
of Whetzel's activities, the plaintiffs contend that Flecher 
had heard enough allegations against Whetzel and knew 
enough about the inadequate system for addressing those 
allegations that he must have known of the excessive risk 
of harm to the plaintiffs. 
 
While this issue is a close one, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs' evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact 
as to Flecher's deliberate indifference. The plaintiffs have 
provided evidence that Flecher was awar e of three 
allegations of abuse by Whetzel, but there is no evidence 
that Flecher believed that these allegations wer e likely to be 
true, or that the evidence surrounding the allegations was 
so strong that he must have believed them likely to be true. 
In fact, the plaintiffs have presented evidence that Flecher 
disbelieved the allegations: his statement to McLean that 
"these types of accusations occur on a fr equent basis when 
female students become upset or angry with staf f 
members." See supra note 3. This statement is illuminating 
of Flecher's subjective mindset of basic skepticism 
regarding the allegations raised by the female YDC 
residents; although this mindset does not comport well with 
YDC's official policies and Pennsylvania law, it is also 
inconsistent with the subjective knowledge of a risk 
required for deliberate indiffer ence under Farmer. 
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The plaintiffs here have failed to pr esent the kind of 
evidence that successful plaintiffs have pr esented in 
deliberate indifference cases after Farmer: evidence that 
directly shows that Flecher either knew of the excessive risk 
to the plaintiffs or was aware of such overwhelming 
evidence that he had to know of such a risk. The case is 
thus different from Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742 (3d 
Cir. 1997), where we reversed the grant of summary 
judgment in a deliberate indifference case for a prison 
official defendant who was in charge of prison transfers. 
The plaintiff in Hamilton presented evidence that, before the 
attack, the defendant had received a recommendation that 
the plaintiff be placed in protective custody because of his 
risk of being attacked, the defendant knew that the plaintiff 
was more likely to be attacked because he was a prison 
informant, and the defendant had approved putting the 
plaintiff in protective custody on two pr evious occasions.12 
The plaintiffs' evidence against Flecher falls well below this 
level. 
 
Flecher investigated McAfee's allegation, and either he or 
Earnhart investigated Beers-Capitol's allegation (the record 
is not clear what happened with Good's allegation). 
Although these investigations may have been inadequate, 
we do not review the adequacy of a defendant's response to 
an excessive risk to inmate safety in a deliberate 
indifference case until the plaintif f has established that the 
defendant knew or was aware of that risk. See Farmer, 511 
U.S. at 844. The performance of a less-than-thorough 
investigation of a risk does not show that the investigator 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. See also Spruce v. Sargent, 149F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1998) (reversing 
district court's judgment as a matter of law for one defendant in a 
deliberate indifference case because the plaintiff-prisoner presented 
documents signed by that defendant which contained numerous 
references to sexual attacks the plaintif f was suffering, but affirming 
judgment for another defendant because the plaintif f did not present 
similar evidence as to that defendant); Pavlick v. Mifflin, 90 F.3d 205 
(7th 
Cir. 1996) (affirming entry of judgment for the plaintiff-prisoner in 
deliberate indifference case because the plaintiff presented evidence 
that, 
moments before he was attacked while sleeping in his cell by prison gang 
members who had a grudge against him, the defendant, a prison guard, 
was outside plaintiff 's cell talking with these gang members, and then 
the defendant unlocked the door to plaintiff 's cell and walked away). 
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believed that the excessive risk existed--indeed, it may 
show the opposite. Finally, Flecher's failur e to notify Liggett 
of these allegations is evidence of negligence in the 
performance of his job, but it does nothing to support the 
claim that he knew or must have known of the excessive 
risk to the plaintiffs. 
 
The most that the plaintiffs show is that Flecher followed 
a set of de facto rules and policies that involved his 
deciding on his own whether and how to investigate certain 
allegations of abuse, in violation of YDC policy and 
Pennsylvania law. While this course of action was 
imprudent, and in fact led to a very regr ettable outcome, it 
does not constitute deliberate indiffer ence as the Supreme 
Court defined that concept in Farmer. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs have presented no other evidence that shows that 
Flecher was subjectively aware of the excessive risk to the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have thus failed to raise a genuine 
issue of fact as to the existence of deliberate indifference on 
the part of Flecher, and we will affir m the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in his favor. 
 
4. Nora Burley, Counselor in Unit 7 
 
Burley worked in Unit 7 as a counselor; her job was to 
provide security in the unit and monitor r esident 
interactions. The plaintiffs' deliberate indif ference claims 
against Burley center solely on direct liability, as Burley 
was not a supervisor. The plaintiffs pr esent fairly 
substantial evidence of Burley's knowledge or awar eness of 
the excessive risk that Whetzel posed to the female 
residents. Burley testified in a deposition that, while she 
was at YDC, she had heard general rumors fr om the 
residents that Whetzel was having sex with some of the 
female residents, but she did not investigate these rumors 
or report them to her supervisors. She did, however, make 
file notes of these rumors "[t]o cover my behind, in case it 
were true." 
 
Burley was also told on a couple of occasions that 
Guyaux claimed to have a sexual relationship with Whetzel. 
Burley did not inform her supervisors of this allegation, but 
instead set up a meeting with Whetzel, Guyaux, and 
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another counselor to ask Guyaux about it.13 Burley also 
testified that she knew McAfee had a sexual inter est in 
Whetzel, although she did not report or investigate this. 
Finally, and most tellingly, Tate testified in her deposition 
that Burley admitted to her that "she kind of knew that 
[Whetzel] was messing with students" when T ate told 
Burley of Whetzel's assault on her.14 [1532a, Tate Dep.] 
 
We are satisfied that the plaintif fs have presented 
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to Burley's deliberate indifference to the excessive risk 
Whetzel posed to the plaintiffs. Burley's statement to Tate 
that she "kind of knew" that Whetzel was "messing" with 
students is significant evidence that Burley was"aware of 
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]" and that she 
"also dr[ew] the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The 
other evidence about what Burley knew strengthens this 
conclusion. Moreover, the fact that Burley said to Tate that 
she did not know that Whetzel was "messing" with Tate in 
particular does not constitute a defense to a deliberate 
indifference claim; Farmer is clear that a defendant need 
not know that the particular inmate attacked was at risk, 
as it is enough for deliberate indiffer ence if a defendant 
knows that inmates in the plaintiff 's situation face such a 
risk. See id. at 843-44. 
 
For the purposes of reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants, Burley basically admitted that 
she had knowledge of Whetzel's abusive activities by the 
time of Tate's abuse in her statement to T ate. The difficulty 
for Beers-Capitol is that this admission was made in 
January 1995, approximately ten months after Beers- 
Capitol was abused, and Beers-Capitol must show that 
Burley knew of the risk Whetzel posed before he abused 
Beers-Capitol. See Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 
(7th Cir. 1997). However, even though the abuse of Beers- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. This was the meeting to which Whetzel br ought Guyaux, threatening 
her en route. 
 
14. Tate's recounting of Burley's comment is admissible evidence 
because, as an admission by a party-opponent, it is not hearsay under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 
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Capitol occurred before Burley made her admission to Tate, 
we think that the evidence presented by the plaintiffs raises 
a genuine issue of fact as to what Burley was awar e of 
regarding Whetzel at the time Beers-Capitol was abused. 
 
Burley's awareness of Whetzel's activities had to have 
been based upon some information she r eceived before she 
made her admission to Tate in January 1995. Burley 
admitted in her deposition that, during her time at YDC, 
she heard various rumors that Whetzel was having sex with 
female residents, and she made file notes of these rumors, 
"[t]o cover my behind, in case it wer e true." Because we 
draw all inferences in the non-movant's favor in our review 
of a summary judgment motion, we conclude that these 
rumors formed at least part of the basis for her awareness 
of Whetzel's activities. Burley had started to hear these 
rumors at least by March 1993 (a full year before Beers- 
Capitol was abused), when she set up a meeting with 
Whetzel and Melissa Guyaux to investigate rumors that 
Whetzel and Guyaux were having sex. Thus, Beers-Capitol 
has shown that Burley received at least some of the 
information that formed the basis for her awareness before 
Beers-Capitol was abused. 
 
The short of it is that, drawing all inferences in Beers- 
Capitol's favor, it is possible that Burley r eceived enough 
information about Whetzel's activities that she formed her 
awareness of these activities by March 1994, when Beers- 
Caitol was abused. This creates a genuine issue of fact as 
to what Burley knew when, and the evidence pr esented 
could support a conclusion by the factfinder that Burley's 
awareness arose before March 1994. Under this 
circumstance, the evidence presented r egarding Burley is 
sufficient to get both Tate and Beers-Capitol past summary 
judgment. We will thus reverse the grant of summary 
judgment for Burley on both plaintiffs' claims.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. As we noted earlier, the defendants also assert qualified immunity; 
the District Court did not reach this issue because it granted summary 
judgment to the defendants on the merits. While it is not necessary for 
us to decide this claim as to the other defendants because we will affirm 
the summary judgment grants for them, it is a live issue as it relates to 
Burley. The qualified immunity argument fails, however, because, to the 
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5. Shirley Robinson, Youth Development Aide in Unit 7 
 
As a youth development aide, Robinson perfor med a role 
that was similar to a YDC counselor's: providing security in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
extent that the plaintiffs have made a showing sufficient to overcome 
summary judgment on the merits, they have also made a showing 
sufficient to overcome any claim to qualified immunity. 
 
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials 
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability 
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 
(1982). It is the defendants' burden to establish that they are entitled 
to 
such immunity. See Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 
726 (3d Cir. 1989). That is, the defendants must show that their conduct 
did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known."The contours of the right 
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Unlike Farmer's subjective test of what the prison 
official knew, the test for qualified immunity is objective. "Under the 
test 
announced in Harlow, reasonableness is measured by an objective 
standard; arguments that the defendants desired to handle or 
subjectively believed that they had handled the incidents properly are 
irrelevant." Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. at 641). That is, Burley is entitled to qualified immunity only if 
she 
can show that a reasonable person in her position at the relevant time 
could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that her conduct 
comported with established legal standards. See id. 
 
There is no question that the plaintiffs' constitutional right that was 
violated--the right not to be sexually abused by a state employee while 
in confinement--was clearly established at the time of Burley's relevant 
actions. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
102-03 (1976); Stoneking, 882 F.3d at 726. The doctrine of deliberate 
indifference was also clearly established at the relevant time. See 
Estelle, 
429 U.S. at 104-05. The key issue for our purposes is whether Burley's 
relevant conduct was objectively reasonable, or, more specifically, 
whether a reasonable YDC worker in her situation could have believed 
that her conduct comported with established legal standards, i.e., she 
was not being deliberately indifferent to the existence of an excessive 
risk to the plaintiffs (either because she thought that there was no 
excessive risk or because she thought that her r esponse was adequate). 
We have determined, however, that the plaintiffs have raised a genuine 
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the units and monitoring resident interactions. As with 
Burley, the plaintiffs' claims against Robinson involve only 
direct liability. The plaintiffs pr offer the following two acts 
as evidence of Robinson's deliberate indiffer ence: (1) when 
Beers-Capitol told Robinson that Whetzel impr egnated her, 
Robinson's first response was to say, "W ell, you know you 
can get in trouble making accusations like that,"; and (2) 
Robinson delayed reporting Beers-Capitol's allegation to her 
supervisor (although it is unclear from the r ecord exactly 
how long this delay was, as Robinson's and Ear nhart's 
testimony differ on this point). Because these actions by 
Robinson occurred after Beers-Capitol's abuse, and the 
plaintiffs present no evidence regar ding Robinson's 
awareness of Whetzel's activities befor e that abuse, Beers- 
Capitol has presented no evidence to support her deliberate 
indifference claim against Robinson. See Lewis v. Richards, 
107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997). T ate, however, has a 
potential direct deliberate indiffer ence claim against 
Robinson, as her abuse occurred after Robinson's actions, 
and Tate can argue that these actions ar e evidence that, by 
the time of Tate's abuse, Robinson was awar e of the risk 
Whetzel posed to the female residents but was indifferent to 
this risk. 
 
Nevertheless, we conclude that the above-described 
evidence is an insufficient basis for inferring that Robinson 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
issue of material fact as to whether Burley was deliberately indifferent. 
Because deliberate indifference underFarmer requires actual knowledge 
or awareness on the part of the defendant, a defendant cannot have 
qualified immunity if she was deliberately indif ferent; a reasonable YDC 
worker could not believe that her actions comported with clearly 
established law while also believing that ther e is an excessive risk to 
the 
plaintiffs and failing to adequately r espond to that risk. Conduct that 
is 
deliberately indifferent to an excessive risk to YDC residents cannot be 
objectively reasonable conduct. See Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 
F.3d 339, 356 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that, if the plaintiff succeeds in 
establishing that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to 
constitutional rights, then a fortiori the defendants' conduct was not 
objectively reasonable, and hence the defense of qualified immunity 
would not be available to defendants). Because ther e is a genuine issue 
of fact as to whether Burley was deliberately indif ferent, she has not 
carried her burden to establish that she is entitled to such immunity. 
We thus reject Burley's qualified immunity claim. 
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"knowingly and unreasonably disregar d[ed] an objectively 
intolerable risk of harm." Farmer , 511 U.S. at 846. The 
plaintiffs' evidence contains only a single instance where 
Robinson was informed of an allegation against Whetzel. 
Moreover, she did report this allegation to her supervisor 
(albeit after a short delay). While Robinson's r esponse to the 
allegation--telling Beers-Capitol that "you can get in trouble 
making allegations like that"--was certainly inappropriate 
given her responsibilities as a youth development aide, this 
impropriety is not enough to show deliberate indifference. 
Furthermore, Robinson did report the allegation to her 
supervisor, which was a reasonable r esponse. Although 
Robinson delayed her report somewhat, this minor delay 
surely had little or no effect on Whetzel's risk to Tate, who 
was not yet at YDC at the time of Beers-Capitol's allegation. 
 
The most that Tate can claim is that Robinson's original 
response to Beers-Capitol and her delay in r eporting the 
allegation made Beers-Capitol less likely to continue to 
maintain her allegation when later questioned. As with 
Flecher, however, such evidence goes to the adequacy of 
Robinson's response to the risk, and we do not reach that 
question until we determine that there is a genuine issue of 
as to Robinson's awareness of the risk. One allegation, 
later denied, is not sufficient evidence for us to infer that 
Robinson knew or must have known of the risk to T ate. We 
therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment for 
Robinson. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment as to the defendants 
Liggett, Earnhart, Flecher, and Robinson, and reverse the 
grant of summary judgment for Burley. The case will be 
remanded to the District Court for further pr oceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Parties to bear their own 
costs. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                34 
